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DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL COAL
LEASING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1975 ("FCLAA")
References:

30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, as amended by the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976).
43 C.F.R. Parts 3450, 3470, 3480 (1984).

I.

Background - Developments Before Enactment of the FCLAA
A.

Prior to August 4, 1976, the date of enactment of
the FCLAA, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as then
amended, delegated broad discretion to the
Secretary of the Interior with respect to federal
coal leasing but provided few standards for exer
cise of that discretion.
1.

The Secretary of the Interior was authorized
to issue coal prospecting permits for a term
of two years.

If, within that two-year

period, the permittee showed that the land
contained coal in commercial quantities, the
permittee could apply for a preference right
lease for all or part of the land included in
his permit.
a.

(30 U.S.C. § 201(b)).

As construed by the agency for nearly
60 years, a prospecting permitee who
established the presence of commercial
quantities of coal in the area covered by
the permit was automatically entitled to

such a preference right lease.

(Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc, v.
Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 555 n.5, 557-558
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah International , Inc,
v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962, 964 (D. Utah
1979)).
b.

For a definition of commercial quantities
Interior relied upon U.S.G.S. determina
tions of whether the coal deposit existed
and whether it was workable, i.e., could
be mined by existing technology.

(Natural

Resources Defense Council, 609 F.2d at
556, n.7; Utah International, 488 F. Supp.
at 964-965).
c.

Many pre-FCLAA leases were issued in this
manner.

(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 17 (1975)).
2,

The Secretary was also authorized to award
leases by competitive bidding or by such other
methods as he might by regulation adopt.
U.S.C. § 201(a)).

(30

Few pre-FCLAA leases, how

ever, were issued following competitive bid
ding where multiple bids were received./ (H.R.
Rep. No. 94-681 at 17).
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3.

The leases awarded required the lessees to pay
a royalty of at least five cents per ton and
an annual rental beginning at a minimum of 25
cents per acre and escalating to a minimum of
fifty cents per acre in the second year and to
a minimum of one dollar per acre in the sixth
year.

4.

(30 U.S.C. § 207).

The leases were for indeterminate periods upon
condition of diligent development and contin
ued operation of the mine or mines, except
when such operation was interrupted by
strikes, the elements, or casualties not
attributable to the lessee.

(30 U.S.C.

§ 207 ) .
a.

Diligent development and continued
operation were not defined by regulation
before December, 1974.
94-681 at 12-15).

(H.R. Rep. No.

Lease terms did little

more than recite the statutory language of
diligent development and continued opera
tion.

Neither the regulations nor the

lease terms provided any standards or
mechanism for enforcement of those condi
tions .
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b.

Administration of the diligence require
ments was lax.

No proceeding to cancel a

lease for lack of compliance with dili
gence requirements was ever initiated.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 14-15).

Percep

tions of the value and marketability of
the federal coal reserves (primarily
western deposits of low-sulphur coal
located at great distances from many
potential markets) may have contributed to
the lack of interest in enforcing the
diligence requirements.
5.

The Secretary had discretion to accept payment
of an annual advance royalty upon a minimum
amount of coal in lieu of the provision
requiring continuous operation of the mine,
provided that he determined this was in the
public interest and that the amount of the
advance royalty was at least equal to the
amount of rentals.
a.

(30 U.S.C. § 207).

In practice this provision was construed
to permit payment of an annual advance
royalty upon a minimum amount of coal in
lieu of development as well as operation
after production had begun.
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b.

Payment of these nominal advance royalties
in lieu of development and extraction of
coal reserves was a common practice.
According to testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Mines and Mining in 1975,
474 of 533 federal coal leases were held
under a waiver of the condition of con
tinued operation issued by the Secretary
and payment of advance royalties.

(H.R.

Rep. No. 94-681 at 14-15).
6.

The Secretary could also permit suspension of
operations under a coal lease for a period up
to six months at any one time when market con
ditions were such that the lease could not be
operated except at a loss.

7.

(30 U.S.C. § 207).

The leases issued also included the further
condition that at the end of each twenty-year
period following the date of the lease, the
Secretary of the Interior could make such
readjustment of terms and conditions as he
might determine, unless otherwise provided by
law at the time of expiration of such twenty
year period.

8.

(30 U.S.C. § 207).

The pre-FCLAA statute also limited the right
of common-carrier railroads to obtain federal
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coal leases in excess of their own needs
(30 U.S.C. § 202), authorized consolidation or
collective prospecting, development and opera
tion of coal fields (30 U.S.C. §§ 201-l(a),
205), authorized the lease of additional
tracts upon the same conditions as the orig
inal leasehold upon a showing by the lessee
that all workable coal deposits would be
exhausted within 3 years thereafter (30 U.S.C.
§ 204), and authorized the issuance of limited
licenses to take coal for local domestic needs
without an obligation to make royalty payments
(30 U.S.C. § 208).
B.

By the 1970's, federal coal leasing was widely
regarded by the administration, Congress and public
interest groups as undesirable for a variety of
reasons.
1.

It was perceived that the public received an
inadequate and unfair return on its coal
lands.
a.

The amounts of production royalty, rental
and advance royalty payments required by
federal coal leases were far below ^air
market value as measured by the terms fee
leases then received.

-6-

The average federal

production royalty over 54 years of leas
ing was only 12.5£ per ton.

Although

royalty rates had increased seventy five
percent since 1920, the price of a ton of
coal had more than doubled, so the actual
production royalty paid was a smaller
percentage of the value of the coal than
it had been in 1920.

(H.R. Rep. No.

94-681 at 18).
b.

Few coal leases issued were the result of
competitive sales.

Many were preference

right leases, and of those leases issued
by competitive bidding, seventy two
percent were bid upon by less than two
bidders.

Since the amount of the bid is

related to the number of bidders, leases
for which only one bid was received were
less likely to result in a fair return to
the public.
2.

(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 17)

The public also received an inadequate return
because most federal coal leases were
undeveloped and did not produce coal,
a.

Prior to an informal Interior decision to
impose a coal leasing moratorium in 1971,
acreage under lease had increased while
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production had declined.

Acreage under

lease had increased from about 80,000
acres in 1945 to 778,000 acres in 1970, or
1/1000 of 1 percent of the public lands.
Production in that period, however, had
declined from 10 million tons in 1945 to
7.2 million tons in 1970.

(Sen. Rep. No.

94-296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975)).
b.

Most federal coal leases were nonproduc
ing.

Of 533 leases outstanding in 1975,

only 59 were in production.
No. 94-681 at 14-15).

(H.R. Rep.

Ninety-one and one-

half percent of the land under federal
coal leases was held under nonproducing
leases.
c.

(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 11).

Many such leases had been held for years
by the payment of nominal advance
royalties permitted by the Secretary in
lieu of development.

(H.R. Rep. No.

94-681 at 14-15).
d.

There was an absence of any meaningful
diligence criteria to assure production
/

under existing leases.

J

The Department of

the Interior had never defined the terms
"diligent development" and "continued
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operation" before December, 1974 and had
never cancelled a lease for failure to
comply with those conditions.

(H.R. Rep.

No. 94-681 at 14-15).
3.

There was also a widespread belief that only
speculators benefitted from the federal coal
leasing program as it existed in 1975.

Coal

lease brokers, rather than companies which
were coal producers, held significant amounts
of coal lands.

As of 1970, 761,000 acres of

public and acquired lands included within out
standing coal prospecting permits were held
principally by speculators.
94-296 at 9.
14-16).

(Sen. Rep. No.

See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at

Speculators who had obtained coal

leases and prospecting permits at prices below
fair market value received, or had the poten
tial to receive, substantial profits when the
demand for coal increased in the early 1970's.
4.

The oil shortage in the early 1970's created
new and increased demand for coal by utilities
and industry.

Production was slow to

increase, and critics pointed to the number of
nonproducing federal leases as a factor con
tributing to the shortage.
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a.

The ownership of leases by speculators,
rather than coal producers, was seen as
one reason for lack of production.

b.

Concentrations of holdings as evidenced by
the fact that fifteen leaseholders held
leases on two-thirds of the leased federal
coal acreage was regarded as a further
restraint on production.

(H.R. Rep. No.

94-681 at 15-17).
c.

The fact that some of the companies with
the largest number of federal coal leases
or acres were owned by major oil or mining
companies also raised concerns about pos
sible disincentives to produce coal.
Cong. Rec. 484 (1976)

122

(comments of

Rep. Young).
5.

Growing concern with land use planning and the
environmental impact of coal leasing and min
ing led to questions about the wisdom of
Interior's reactive leasing in answer to
stated needs of industry and its inability to
deny preference right leases to prospecting
/

permittees who were otherwise entitled to them
regardless of the impact on the environment.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 18-19); Natural
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Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund,
609 F .2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
C.

The administrative response to these concerns was
to stop leasing until new regulations to provide
the Secretary with greater administrative control
over the leasing system could be adopted.
1.

From May, 1971 to February, 1973, the Bureau
of Land Management issued no coal leases.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 11).

2.

The Secretary undertook to develop a new
leasing system so that the size, timing and
location of coal leases would more effectively
meet the U.S.'s energy needs.

In February,

1973, the Secretary of the Interior suspended
further issuance of coal prospecting permits
and halted all federal coal leasing (except
under short term relief criteria).

(H.R. Rep.

No. 94-681 at 11).
3.

In December, 1974, Interior published proposed
regulations to address the problem of specula
tive holding of leases and that of lease
size.

Those regulations established locigal

mining units and defined diligent development
and continuous operation.

Diligent develop

ment was defined in terms of work directed
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toward production of coal, rather than in
terms of a certain amount of production.

It

included environmental studies, geological
studies, mapping, surveying, engineering, and
other work done in preparation to mine.
Continuous operation meant production of
commercial quantities of coal without inter
ruptions greater than 6 months.

(H.R. Rep.

No. 94-681 at 12-14).
D.

In the meantime, Congress took over the problem of
federal coal leasing and focused on the royalty and
diligence issues.
1.

In the royalty area, Congress drew a compar
ison between the coal industry and the oil and
gas industry and imposed a typical oil and gas
lessor's royalty of a minimum of 12-1/2
percent on federal coal leases, except that a
lesser royalty of 8 percent could be applied
to underground coal mines.

(Fair Market Value

Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, Linowes
Commission Report (1984), p. 287).
a.

This was a substantial increase from the
prior royalty rate of a minimum of five
cents per ton.
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b.

The increase was not tied to the realities
of coal development which, unlike oil and
gas, typically requires a large initial
investment and significant continuing
investment over the life of the mine.

2.

In the diligence area, Congress set detailed
standards of diligence and provided for harsh
and absolute penalties for failure to meet
those standards.
a.

Diligence was defined in terms of achiev
ing a certain amount of production within
a set period and maintaining a particular
amount of production thereafter, rather
than in terms of investment or good
faith.

The definition apparently was

selected without regard for the long lead
times needed to bring a coal mine into
production or the need to arrange for
special transportation arrangements and
long-term purchaser contracts before
development and marketing can begin.

The

definition also ignored the effect of
market conditions, events of force
majeure, and other limitations on the
development and operation of coal mines.
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(Letters of Assistant Secretary of
Interior to Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, dated July 17, 1975,
Sen. Rep. No. 94-296 at 48-49, and to
House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, dated July 22, 1975, H.R. Rep.
No. 94-681 at 38-39; Sen. Rep. No. 94-296
at 60-61 (comments of Sen. Hansen).

See

also Linowes Commission Report, pp.
294-95).
b.

The penalties for lack of compliance with
the diligence requirements, cancellation
of the nonproducing lease or disqualifica
tion of the lessee from making application
for future leases, permit no exercise of
discretion by the Secretary to mitigate
their effect in individual cases.

II.

Diligence Criteria Under the FCLAA.
A.

Section 6(b) of the FCLAA (30 U.S.C. § 207(b))
provides that:
Each lease shall be subject to the condi
tions of diligent development and con
tinued operation of the mine or mines,
except where operations under the lease
.
are interrupted by strikes, the elements,
or casualties not attributable to the
lessee. The Secretary of the Interior,
upon determining that the public interest
will be served thereby, may suspend the

-14-

/

condition of continued operation upon the
payment of advance royalties ... [f]or an
aggregate number of years during the
period of any lease ... [which shall] not
exceed ten.... Nothing in this subsec
tion shall be construed to affect the
requirement contained in the second
sentence of subsection (a) of this
section relating to commencement of pro
duction at the end of ten years.
(See also 43 C.F.R. § 3475.5 (1984)).
1.

Diligent development is defined as production
of recoverable coal reserves in commercial
quantities (one percent of recoverable coal
reserves) within a ten year period. (43 C.F.R.
§ 3480.0-5(a)(6), (12), (13) (1984)).

2.

Continued operation means production of not
less than commercial quantities (one percent)
of recoverable coal reserves in each of the
first two years following achievement of dili
gent development and an average amount of not
less than one percent of recoverable coal
reserves per year thereafter, computed on a
three-year basis consisting of the year in
question and the two preceding years.
(43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(6), (8), (9) (1984)).

3.

Each lease issued after enactment of the FCLAA
is required to achieve diligent development
within ten years after its effective date and

-15-

is thereafter subject to the requirement of
continued operation.

(43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.1(a)(1), (2) (1984) ) .
4.

Each lease issued prior to enactment of the
FCLAA is required to achieve diligent develop
ment within ten years after the first lease
readjustment after August 4, 1976, or the
operator's prior election to be subject to the
FCLAA, and is thereafter subject to the
requirement of continued operation.
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.1(b)(1)(2)

5.

The diligent development requirement cannot be
suspended or extended.
43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)(1)

6.

(1984)).

(30 U.S.C. § 207(b);
(1984)).

The condition of continued operation may be
suspended upon application if the Secretary
determines that suspension is in the public
interest.

(30 U.S.C. § 207(b); 43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.3(a)
a.

(1984)).

That condition may be suspended by the
period of time during which the authorized
officer finds operations are interrupted
by strikes, the elements, or casualties
not attributable to the operator/lessee.
(30 U.S.C. § 209; 43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a)(1)
(1984)).
-16-

b.

It also may be suspended upon the payment
of advance royalty in an amount equal to
the production royalty (8 percent if the
coal would be recovered only by under
ground mining operations; 12-1/2 percent
if it would be recovered by surface mining
operations) due on the production of one
percent of the recoverable coal
reserves.

(30 U.S.C. § 207(b); 43 C.F.R.

§§ 3483.3(a)(2), 3483.4(a),

(c) (1984)).

Advance royalty may not be accepted in
lieu of the requirement of continued oper
ation on any lease for more than ten
years.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(d)

(1984)).

It may be credited against production
royalties due during the initial twenty
year term of the lease.

(43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.4(e), (f) (1984) ).
7.

Operations and production also may be
suspended upon application if determined to be
in the interest of conservation by the
Secretary.

(30 U.S.C. § 209; 43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.3(b) (1984)).
a.

Such suspensions do not apply to the
diligent development period, but do
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suspend all other lease terms including
rental and royalty payments.

Minimum

annual production requirements are pro
portionately reduced for that portion of a
federal lease year for which operations
are so suspended.
§ 3483.3(b)(1),
b.

(43 C.F.R.

(2) (1984)).

The term of the lease will be extended by
adding any period of suspension to it. .
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)(3)

(1984)).

8.. Not all production must be credited toward
achievement of diligent development.
a.

All production on post-FCLAA leases after
the lease effective date must be credited
toward diligent development.

(43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.5(a)(1984)).
b.

Production on pre-FCLAA leases after the
effective date of the first lease
readjustment after August 4, 1976 must be
credited toward diligent development.
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.5(b)

c.

(1984)).

For pre-FCLAA leases which have not been
readjusted and which the operator/lessee
elected to subject to the FCLAA diligence
requirements prior to August 30, 1983, all
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production between August 4, 1976 and the
effective date of the election may be
credited toward diligent development.

All

production after the effective date of the
election, however, must be so credited.
(43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1(b)(1), 3483.5(c),

(d)

(1984)).
d.

For pre-FCLAA leases which have been
readjusted after August 4, 1976, all
production between August 4, 1976 and the
effective date of the first lease
readjustment may be applied toward dili
gent development if the operator/lessee so
requests.

Such a request must comply with

the election requirements under 43 C.F.R.
§ 3483.1(b)(1), and presumably the opera
tor must have made this request prior to
August 30, 1983 as well.
§ 3483.5(e)
B.

(43 C.F.R.

(1984)).

Section 6(c) requires submission for the
Secretary's approval of:
an operation and reclamation plan prior
to taking any action on a leasehold which
might cause a significant disturbance of
the environment, and not later than three
years after a lease is issued.
(30 U.S.C. § 207(c)).
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1.

The regulations permit extension of the threeyear period for filing a resource recovery and
protection plan upon application and after a
determination by the Secretary that it is in
the public interest.

Interruption of opera

tions by strikes, the elements, or casualties
not attributable to the operator/lessee permit
an extension, but payment of advance royalty
does not.
C.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a)

(1984)).

Similar diligence requirements apply to logical
mining units (LMUs) under Section 5 of the FCLAA.
(30 U.S.C. § 202a(2); 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(h)(2)
(1984)).

An operator/lessee may initiate, or the

authorized officer may direct, consolidation of
coal leases into LMUs upon a determination that
maximum economic recovery of coal would be served
thereby.

30 U.S.C. § 202(a)(1); 43 C.F.R.

§ 3487.1(b)

(1984)).

An LMU is a consolidation of

one or more federal leases and may include inter
vening or adjacent private or state-owned coal
deposits in a single unit of no more than 25,000
contiguous acres under the control of a single
operator and worked as a single operation.

(30

U.S.C. § 202a(1), (7); 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(f)(1),
(5) (1984)).
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1.

An LMU, like an individual lease, must achieve
diligent development within a ten year
period.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.1(a)(1)

(1984)).

For LMUs containing a pre-FCLAA lease which
has not been readjusted after August 4, 1976,
prior to LMU approval, the diligent develop
ment period begins on the effective approval
date of the LMU.

(43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-

5(13)(ii)(A) (1984)).

For LMUs without such a

lease, the diligent development period begins
on the effective date of the most recent
federal lease issuance or readjustment prior
to LMU approval.

(43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-

5(13)(ii)(B) (1984)).
2.

After achieving diligent development an LMU
must maintain continued operation for every
continued operation year thereafter.
C.F.R. § 3483.1(a)(2) (1984)).

(43

The condition

of continued operation may be suspended upon
application if it is determined to be in the
public interest.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a)

(1984)).
a.

That condition may be suspended when
operations are interrupted by strikes, the
elements, or casualties not attributable
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to the operator.
§ 3483.3(a)(1)
b.

(43 C.F.R.

(1984)).

It may be suspended upon payment of
advance royalty.
§ 3483.3(a)(2)

(43 C.F.R.

(1984)).

The amount of

advance royalty must be equal to the
production royalty (8 percent if the coal
is mined by underground operations; 12-1/2
percent if it is mined by other means) due
on production of one percent of the
federal LMU recoverable coal reserves.
(43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(c)

(1984)).

This

option may be exercised for no more than
ten years.

Periods of payment of advance

royalty on individual leases in the LMU
prior to their inclusion in the LMU are
not considered in calculating the ten-year
period.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(d)

(1984)).

Advance royalties may be credited against
production royalties during the initial
twenty year term of the LMU, and advance
royalties paid on leases in their initial

/

term prior to inclusion in the LMU may
also be credited against LMU production
royalties to the extent they were not
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previously credited against lease produc
tion royalties.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.4(f)

(1984)).
3.

The authorized officer may also suspend the
requirement of continued operation in the
interest of conservation.
43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)

(30 U.S.C. § 209;

(1984)).

In that

instance all terms and conditions of the LMU,
including rental and royalty payments and
excepting the diligent development period, are
also suspended.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b)(1)

(1984) ) .
4.

Production anywhere within the LMU of either
federal or nonfederal coal reserves applies
toward satisfaction of the conditions of dili
gent development and continued operation.
C.F.R. § 3483.6(a) (1984)).

(43

Any production

credited to a federal lease prior to its
inclusion in an LMU also applies toward dili
gent development for the LMU.
§ 3483.5(g)
5.

(43 C.F.R.

(1984)).

Operators of LMUs also are required to file
plans for resource recovery and protection
within three years of approval of the LMU.
(43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(e)(1) (1984)).
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a.

That period may be extended if the
Secretary determines it is in the public
interest.

Interruptions of operations by

strikes, the elements, or casualties not
attributable to the operator are events
authorizing extension.

(43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.3(a)(1) (1984)).
6.

Any federal lease included in an LMU is
subject to the diligence requirements imposed
on the LMU in lieu of those that would apply
to the lease individually.

(43 C.F.R.

§§ 3475.6(b), 3483.1(c), 3487.1(b),

(e)(4)

(1984)).
7.

An additional diligence requirement applies to
LMUs.

The reserves of an LMU must be mined

within a period established by the Secretary
which is not more than 40 years.

(30 U.S.C.

§ 202(a)(3); 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(e)(6)
D.

(1984)).

In order to qualify for new leases under Section 3
of the FCLAA, a prospective lessee which already
has federal coal leases, or which has an affiliate
or a subsidiary, is controlled by, or is under

/

common control with an entity holding federal coal
leases, must meet a separate diligence require
ment.

Those federal coal leases which the prospec-
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tive lessee or its related entity holds and has
held for ten years must be producing coal in com
mercial quantities.

(30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A); 43

C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e) (1984)).
1.

"Producing coal in commercial quantities" is
not yet defined by regulation.

2.

The Bureau of Land Management proposes to use
the definition of commercial quantities used
for the Section 6 diligence standards, namely
one percent of recoverable coal reserves, in
this situation as well.

(50 Fed. Reg. 6398,

6399 (1985)).
3.

The proposed definition of producing, however,
is considerably more complicated.

The Bureau

proposes to use a moving 10-year bracket,
which begins on various dates depending upon
the type of lease, to determine whether the
lease is producing as required.

These dates

are;
a.

the date of lease issuance for leases
issued after August 4, 1976;

b.

the date of first lease readjustment for
pre-FCLAA leases which were first
readjusted after August 4, 1976;

-25-

c.

the date production began for pre-FCLAA
leases which have not been readjusted
after August 4, 1976 and which began
production after August 4, 1976;

d.

the date ten years prior to the date on
which a new lease is sought for pre-FCLAA
leases which have not been readjusted
after August 4, 1976 and which began
production prior to August 4, 1976.
(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6402-04 (1985)).

4.

A nonproducing lease included in a producing
LMU does not prohibit the lessee, or any
affiliate, from qualifying for another federal
lease after August 4, 1986.

(50 Fed. Reg.

6398, 6404 (1985)).
5.

Nonproducing leases, or leases in nonproducing
LMUs, which are under suspension because of
force majeure strikes, the elements, or
casualties not attributable to the
operator/lessee), payment of advance royalty
in lieu of continued operation, or a suspen
sion under 30 U.S.C. § 209 do not prohibit the
lessee, or any affiliate, from qualifying for
another federal lease after August 4, 1986.
(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6404-05 (1985)).
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III.

Penalties for Lack of Diligence
A.

Section 6(a) of the FCLAA requires termination of
leases which fail to meet the diligence require
ments of that Section.
A coal lease shall be for a term of
twenty years and for so long thereafter
as coal is produced annually in commer
cial quantities from that lease. Any
lease which is not producing in commer
cial quantities at the end of ten years
shall be terminated.
(30 U.S.C. § 207(a)).
1.

There is no question that any federal coal
lease issued after enactment of the FCLAA on
August 4, 1976 which is not producing in
commercial quantities ten years after the
lease effective date will be terminated.
(43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1(a), 3483.2(a) (1984)).

2.

Termination of leases for failure to achieve
diligent development also applies to pre-FCLAA
leases ten years after election by the
operator/lessee to be subject to the FCLAA, or
the first lease readjustment after August 4,
1976.

(43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1(b)(1), (2),

3483.2(a)

(1984)).

Upon readjustment the

lease will be made subject to the conditions
of diligent development and continued opera
tion in Section 6 of the FCLAA.
§ 3483.1(c) (1984)).
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(43 C.F.R.

3.

Leases which do not maintain continued
operation or fail to submit a resource
recovery and operation plan are subject to
cancellation.

(43 C.F.R. § 3483.2(c),

(d)

(1984)).
4.

Similar penalties apply to LMUs which do not
meet diligence requirements.
§§ 3483.1(a)(1),
(1984)).

(43 C.F.R.

(2), 3483.2(a),

(d)

If an LMU is terminated for failure

to achieve diligent development, the federal
leases in it are subject to the diligence
requirements that would have applied if they
had not been in the LMU.
§ 3483.2(b)

(1984)).

(43 C.F.R.

Production from the LMU

cannot be prorated among the individual leases
once the LMU terminates, so each lease must
meet the diligence requirements on its own.
(47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33170 (1982)).
B.

Section 3 of the FCLAA disqualifies those with
certain nonproducing leases from applying for new
leases.

It provides that:

The Secretary shall not issue a lease or
leases under the terms of this Act to any
person, association, corporation, or any
subsidiary, affiliate, or persons con
trolled by or under common control with
such person, association, or corporation,
where any such entity holds a lease or
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/

leases issued by the United States to
coal deposits and has held such lease or
leases for a period of ten years when
such entity is not, except as provided
for in section 207(b) of this Act, pro
ducing coal from the lease deposits in
commercial quantities.
In computing the
ten-year period referred to in the pre
ceding sentence, periods of time prior to
the date of enactment of the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 [August 4,
1976,] shall not be counted.
(Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 3, 90 Stat. 1083
(1976); See also 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A));
43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e ) (1984)).
1.

Neither the statute nor the regulation makes
any distinction between pre-FCLAA leases and
post-FCLAA leases for purposes of application
of the Section 3 disqualification to lease.
Based upon the legislative history, this lack
of distinction was intentional and designed to
provide an incentive to lessees with pre-FCLAA
leases to bring their holdings into
production.
The problems of speculation are
addressed directly by H.R. 6721,
which requires termination of any
lease which is not producing in
commercial quantities at the end of
[10] years. Old leases (those
existing on the date of enactment of
the 1975 Act) would be exempt from
this provision, except to the extent
it might be made applicable upon
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readjustment of lease terms, but the
lessees would be prohibited from
acquiring any new Federal leases
should they continue to hold old
leases ten years after enactment
without producing therefrom.
(H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 15
(emphasis added).
See also H. R.
Rep. No. 94-681 at 22; 122 Cong.
Rec. 489 (1976) (comments of Rep.
Mink, sponsor of the bill in the
House)) .
2.

The ten-year period in Section 3 is separate
and independent of the ten-year diligent
development period required by Section 6.

The

Section 3 period began on August 4, 1976, the
date of enactment of the FCLAA, and that
Section's penalty will apply on August 4,
1986, ten years after enactment of the
FCLAA.

(43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e)

(1984).

See

also H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 at 22).
3.

Section 3 provides for exceptions to the
August 4, 1986 deadline, but under current
Interior regulations, none applies when the
company seeking additional leases, or its
affiliate, subsidiary or other entity under
common control, has held a coal lease for ten

/

years which is not producing coal in com
mercial quantities and still holds that lease
on August 4, 1986.
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The exceptions are limited

to leases which have achieved diligent
development and are subject only to the con
dition of continued operation.
a.

Prior Interior regulations had adopted a
construction that the exception for
"strikes, the elements, or casualties not
attributable to the operator/lessee" in
30 U.S.C. § 207(b) tolled the ten-year
period under Section 3 for all pre-FCLAA
leases, even for those which had not
achieved diligent development by August 4,
1986.

(43 C.F.R. §§ 3472.1-2(e),

3475.4(b) (1980)).
b.

Current regulations, however, preclude
such a construction and limit the excep
tion to those leases which have achieved
diligent development and are then subject
only to the condition of continued opera
tion.

(43 C.F.R. §§ 3472.1-2(e ), 3483.4

(1984)).
c.

The recent publication of the draft
proposed guidelines for administration of
Section 3 contains language which may
indicate the Bureau of Land Management is
considering force majeure suspensions for
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leases subject to the FCLAA requirement of
diligent development but which are not yet
subject to the condition of continued
operation.
After a lease or LMU is subject
to either diligent development
or continued operation,
Section 2(a)(2)(A) may be satis
fied by a force majeure
suspension (strikes, the ele
ments, or casualties not
attributable to the lessee) if
approved by the Secretary.
(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6404 (1985)).
4.

The Bureau is also considering regulations to
further determine what is an affiliate under
the Section 3 lease disqualification provi
sion.

5.

(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6400 (1985)).

The Section 3 prohibition does not apply to
modifications of leases to add acreage or
reserves to a lease because application of
_ this Section in that situation could result in
the bypass of coal.

(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6405

(1985)).
IV.

Interim Solutions for Compliance with Diligence
Requirements
A.

/

Inclusion of a nonproducing lease in a logical
mining unit (LMU) may have the effect of extending
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the period in which a particular lease must be
developed under Section 6 of the FCLAA.
1.

If a pre-FCLAA lease which was readjusted after
August 4, 1976 and/or a post-FCLAA lease are
included in an LMU that does not contain a preFCLAA lease which has not been readjusted after
August 4, 1976, the ten-year diligent development
period begins on the effective date of the most
recent lease readjustment or issuance.
§ 3480.0-5(a )(13)(ii)(B )(1984)).

(43 C.F.R.

For example, if

a lease issued on March 1, 1960 and readjusted on
March 1, 1980 is combined in an LMU with a lease
readjusted on June 1, 1982 or a lease issued on
June 1, 1982, the ten-year diligent development
period for the LMU begins on June 1, 1982.

That

adds more than two years to the time in which the
lease originally issued in 1960 must be
developed.

(43 C.F.R. § 3480.05(a )(13)(ii)(B )

(1984); 47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33157-58 (1982)).
2.

Inclusion in an LMU does not benefit pre-FCLAA
leases which have not been readjusted.
a.

To include such a lease in an LMU, a
lessee necessarily elects to subject it to
the FCLAA diligence requirements which
otherwise would not be imposed until
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readjustment.

(43 C.F.R. § 3487.1(b),

(e)(4) (1984)).
b.

Inclusion in an LMU effectively shortens the
period of time in which these leases must
achieve diligent development.

For example, a

May 15, 1968 lease and an April 1, 1974 lease
are included in an LMU approved June 10, 1985.
The LMU diligent development period begins on
the LMU approval date, June 10, 1985, and ends
on June 10, 1995.

If the leases were not

, included in such an LMU they would be readjusted
on May 15, 1988 and on April 1, 1994,
respectively, at which times their ten year
diligent development periods would begin.
(43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(13)(ii)(A)
(1984); 47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33157-58
(1982)).
3.

There are disadvantages to formation of an
LMU.
a.

After coal has been produced from the LMU,
the 40-year period in which the LMU's
recoverable coal reserves must be
exhausted begins.

(43 C.F.R.

§ 3487.1(e)(6) (1984)).

-34-

/

b.

If the LMU fails to achieve diligent
development and is terminated, the leases
in that LMU are individually subject to
the diligent development and continued
operation requirements which would have
applied if the leases had never been
included in an LMU.

(43 C.F.R.

§ 3483.2(a), (b) (1984) ).
c.

Production from an LMU cannot be prorated
among the individual leases after the LMU
terminates, so then each lease must meet
the diligent development and continued
operation requirements on its own or be
terminated.

(47 Fed. Reg. 33114, 33170

(1982)).
B.

Sale or exchange of the entire interest in a preFCLAA lease which is not producing in commercial
quantities to an unrelated entity in an arms-length
transaction will relieve the holder of that lease
of the Section 3 disqualification from acquisition
of new leases.

Relinquishment of the entire

interest in such a lease will also avoid applica
tion of the Section 3 disqualification.
1.

The company assigning, exchanging, or
relinquishing a nonproducing pre-FCLAA lease
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which it holds and will have held for ten
years on August 4, 1986 becomes eligible to
acquire future leases.

(Letter to Sen. John

Warner, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and
Mineral Resources, from Legislative Council,
Interior Department, dated December 2, 1983).
2.

The company acquiring the nonproducing preFCLAA lease does not thereby become subject to
the Section 3 disqualification because it will
not have held the nonproducing lease for ten
years on August 4, 1986.

It, however-, does

not necessarily have a full ten-year period to
achieve diligent development of the assigned
lease.

If that lease has been readjusted, the

assignee has the number of years remaining of
the ten-year period beginning on the readjust
ment date to achieve diligent development.

If

that lease has not been readjusted, the
assignee will have ten years from the
readjustment date to achieve diligent develop
ment.

Lease assignment does not affect the

diligent development requirement of Section 6
/
of the FCLAA.
(Letter to Sen. John Warner,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral
Resources, from Legislative Council, Interior
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Department, dated December 2, 1983.

See also

50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6405 (1985)).
3.

Such a transfer can be made to any company
meeting the requirements for coal lease
applicants.

Prior to August 4, 1986, there is

no limitation on assignments to companies
holding nonproducing leases which they have
held for ten years.

After that date, the

Section 3 disqualification applies to assign
ments of old leases as well as to issuance of
new leases.

(43 C.F.R. §§ 3453.1(a),

3472.1-2(e ) (1984)).
4.

The Bureau of Land Management is considering
the policy implications of approving assign
ments to avoid the prohibition of Section 3
and has solicited public comment on that
issue.

V.

(50 Fed. Reg. 6398, 6399 (1985)).

Problems Created by the Diligence Provisions of the
FCLAA
A.

The definition of diligent development is
unrealistic because it ignores the logistics of
mine development which typically requires nine
years or more.

It also makes no provision for

unexpected fluctuations in coal markets or other
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unforeseen events.

(Fair Market Value for Federal

Coal Leasing , Linowes Commission Report (1984),
pp. 294-95).
B.

The ten year period for diligent development may
also encourage lease holders to initiate coal
development prematurely rather than relinquish the
lease.

This may artificially stimulate excessive

coal production by overriding market incentives to
delay production.

Conservation of federal coal

reserves may be impaired as a result.

In the long

run, this also may raise costs to coal users.
(Linowes Commission Report, pp. 294-95).
C.

The penalty of lease termination for failure to
achieve diligent development in conjunction with
the unrealistic definition of that condition may
deter bidder competition and reduce the prices bid
for federal coal leases.

(Linowes Commission

Report, pp. 169, 295).
D.

Diligence requirements make it difficult to rely on
competitive market mechanisms.

Competition

requires that more reserves be leased than need to
be produced within ten years.

This permits a more

efficient selection of sites to be mined than if
the government selects them.

That efficiency

should reduce the price of coal to users.
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More

leasing, however, conflicts with the goal of dili
gence requirements to produce all coal within a
short specified period.

(Linowes Commission

Report, p. 296).
E.

The selection of a ten year period to achieve a
certain amount of production will lead to arbitrary
and capricious lease termination in that a lease
achieving diligent development in nine years con
tinues, but one that would not achieve it until
after eleven years would be cancelled.

(Linowes

Commission Report, pp. 296-97).
F.

There has been considerable discussion whether the
Section 3 disqualification is limited to applica
tions for coal leases or extends to applications
for any mineral lease issued under the authority of
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.
1.

Research memoranda prepared by the Department
of the Interior Solicitor's Office and the
American Petroleum Institute in 1980 concluded
that the Section 3 disqualification could be
interpreted to prohibit issuance of mineral
leases under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
to any person, association, or corporation
which either holds and has held for ten years
a nonproducing coal lease in its own right or
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is a subsidiary, affiliate, or person con
trolled by or under common control of such a
person, association, or corporation.

This

construction depends upon a conclusion that
"this Act" as used in the FCLAA refers to the
Mineral Leasing Act.

Others construe

Section 3 in this manner as well.

(See

Linowes Commission Report, p. 302; 131 Cong.
Rec. 2500 (March 5, 1985)

(comments of

Sen. Wallop); 131 Cong. Rec. 941 (Jan. 31,
1985) (comments of Sen. Johnston)) . _
2.

The Section 3 disqualification more likely
only applies to coal leases,
a.

Examination of the context in which the
Section 3 disqualification appears indi
cates that it is limited to coal leases.
It is one of several provisions in
30 U.S.C. § 201(a) that create conditions
precedent to the issuance of coal
leases.

These include, preparation of a

comprehensive land use plan, consideration
of the effects of issuing such a lease on

/

local communities, notification of the
proposed offering in the county in which
the land is situated, and consultation
with public entities.
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b.

A broad interpretation of the Section 3
disqualification is also inconsistent with
the structure of the Mineral Leasing
Act.

That Act is divided into "general

provisions" which apply to all leases
issued under that Act (30 U.S.C.
§§ 181-193(2)) and "specific provisions"
which apply to leases of particular
minerals.

(30 U.S.C §§ 201-209 (coal)).

Section 3 of the FCLAA expressly amends
Section 2(a) of the Mineral Leasing Act,
which pertains only to coal leasing
requirements, and only appears as part of
30 U.S.C. § 201(a).

In the case of those

sections of the FCLAA intended to apply to
all mineral leases (Sections 9 and 11, for
example), Congress amended the general
leasing provisions rather than those pro
visions applicable to specific minerals.
c.

The legislative history supports a con
struction of the Section 3 disqualifica
tion as limited to coal leases.

All

references to the restriction on "new
leases" are predicated on the prior use of
language referring to coal leases.
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(122 Cong. Rec. 497 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec.
489 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 19377 (1976);
H. R. Rep No. 94-681 at 22).
d.

Construction of the Section 3 disqualifi
cation as limited to new coal leases is
also supported by contemporaneous inter
pretation of the Department of Interior.
On January 25, 1977, the Department
promulgated regulations implementing the
FCLAA in part and amending existing rules
including those relating to mineral leases
other than coal leases.

The Department

included the Section 3 restriction on new
lease acquisition only in the new coal
leasing regulations.

(42 Fed. Reg. 441 et

seq. (1977); 43 C.F.R. § 3525.1(f)
(1977)).
e.

Present regulations also support this
interpretation.

The Section 3 restriction

appears only in regulations setting out
qualifications for applicants or bidders
on coal leases.

(43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e)
/

■

'

(1984) (coal); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3102.1 et seq.
(1984) (oil and gas); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3502.1
et seq. (1984) (minerals other than coal
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or oil and gas).

See also 47 Fed. Reg.

33114, 33131 (1982) (comments on rulemaking for 43 C.F.R. § 3472-1-2(e )).
3.

However, uncertainty regarding the scope of
the Section 3 disqualification remains, and
until a Supreme Court decision or a change in
the statute by Congress, coal lessees meeting
the criteria of 30 U.S.C. § 201 (a)(2)(A) have
some exposure to disqualification from making
application for new mineral leases issued
under the Mineral Leasing Act.
a.

Regulations limiting the Section 3
disqualification to coal leases can be
changed.

b.

In addition, any oil and gas lease issued
by lottery or competitive bidding may be
challenged by a disgruntled applicant on
the basis that the lessee was unqualified
by reason of the Section 3 restriction.

G.

The term "producing in commercial quantities" in
Section 3 is not clearly defined.

That is the

standard that leases which a lessee, or its
affiliate, holds on August 4, 1986 and which it has
held for the prior ten years must meet if the
lessee is to be eligible to apply for new leases
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under 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A).

Obviously, a

lessee with such a lease that has never produced
coal is disqualified from acquiring future leases
under 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A).

The uncertainty

arises where the amount of production is small or
production is sporadic.
1.

Currently, regulations define commercial
quantities only in the context of diligent
development and continued operation.

(43

C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(6), (8), (12) (1984); 50
Fed. Reg. 6399 (1985)) .
2.

The Bureau of Land Management has proposed
draft guidelines for the proposed administra
tion of the Section 3 disqualification pro
vision and solicited comments on the amount of
production and the time over which it must be
produced to constitute "producing in commer
cial quantities."
(1985)).

(50 Fed. Reg. 6398

These draft guidelines are discussed

in more detail at II.D. above.
VI.

The perceived purpose of the diligence requirements can
be achieved in a less disruptive manner.
A.

/

The purpose of the diligence requirements is to
discourage speculative holding of nonproducing
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federal coal leases and to encourage good faith
development of those leases by the lessees.
B.

Development incentives can be created by provision
for payment of substantial annual advance royalties
for the right to defer development.

C.

Such incentives will not be undermined by per
mitting the Secretary to suspend development
requirements in cases involving loss of market or
events of force majeure.

The current ten-year

period in which a lessee must begin mining coal or
lose the lease is arbitrary and unfair in this
respect.
D.

The Section 3 disqualification provision is
unnecessary if a provision for payment of sub
stantial annual advance royalties to defer
development is adopted.

Section 3 is likely to

have an uneven effect because it would create
unequal development incentives for different
companies unlike annual advance royalties.
VII.

Program for Corrective Action
A.

Congressional relief.
1.

In the past, bills to modify the FCLAA,
especially Section 3, have been introduced in
both houses.

None of them have met with

success.
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2.

There are currently two Senate bills to amend
the FCLAA, S. 372, introduced by Senator
Johnson, and S. 570, introduced by Senator
Wallop, pending in the 99th Congress, 1st
Session.

Both were referred to the Committee

on Energy and Natural Resources.

Repre

sentative Udall is also expected to introduce
a bill in the House for this purpose.
3.

Both Senate bills address the Section 3
disqualification to lease provision.
a.

S. 372 would expressly limit the appli
cation of that Section to coal leases.

It

also permits lessees subject to that
Section's restriction to relinquish nonproducing leases for new leases with
equivalent estimated reserves, or if the
lessee holds no more than two nonproducing
pre-FCLAA leases, to pay an additional
rental on new leases in lieu of disquali
fication.

In addition, the bill requires

the Secretary to accept relinquishment of
pre-FCLAA leases where there has not been
/

significant surface disturbance pursuant
to a permit issued under Section 506 of
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977.
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b.

S. 570 would repeal the Section 3 lease
disqualification provision.

4.

S. 570 proposes to change Section 5 on LMUs.
a.

It deletes the requirement that the leases
in the LMU be contiguous.

b.

It deletes the requirement that the
reserves of the entire LMU be mined within
40 years.

5.

Both Senate bills address the diligence
criteria of Section 6 and the provision for
lease cancellation for failure to meet them.
a.

Both delete the requirement that produc
tion in commercial quantities at the end
of the twenty-year primary term is
required to hold the lease.

S. 372 pro

poses that the lease continue as long as
the condition of continued operation is
met.

S. 570 proposes that the lease con

tinue as long as the conditions of
diligent development and continued opera
tion are met.
b.

Both delete the absolute requirement that
a lease attain diligent development, i.e.,
production in commercial quantities, at
the end of ten years or be terminated.
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In

the alternative, they propose a provision
permitting the lessee to elect to
relinquish the nonproducing lease or
extend it beyond the tenth lease year
through payment of annual advance royal
ties based upon escalating amounts of
assumed production through the twentieth
lease year.
c.

Payment of advance royalties in this
manner would satisfy the diligence condi
tion under S. 372's revised Section 3 for
issuance of new leases.

d.

Only S. 372 addresses the definitions of
the diligence requirements.

It incorpo

rates the definitions of commercial
quantities and diligent development con
tained in the current Interior regula
tions.

It redefines the diligent develop

ment period as ten years beginning on the
effective date of lease issuance for all
leases, whether issued before or after
August 4, 1986.

Finally, it reformulates
/

the definition of continued operation,
which appears at 43 C.F.R. § 3480.05(a)(8), to require production of commer-
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cial quantities of recoverable coal
reserves in each year following the
achievement of diligent development rather
than only in each of the first 2 years
thereafter.
6.

Both Senate bills propose deletion of the
three-year deadline for preparation of an
operation and reclamation plan.

B.

Administrative relief.
1.

Interior has already engaged in interpretative
rulemaking regarding the Section 3 lease
disqualification by including that restriction
in only the regulations governing the quali
fication of applicants for new coal leases.
(43 C.F.R. § 3472.1-2(e ) (1984)).

That alone,

however, is insufficient to provide much cer
tainty for a coal lessee as the statute is
susceptible to a broader reading.
2.

Interior has also proposed guidelines for the
administration of the Section 3 lease
disqualification provision.

(50 Fed.

Reg. 6398 (1985)).
3.

Affected parties could request Interior to
promulgate a specific regulation on the appli
cability of the Section 3 disqualification and
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to support it with a Solicitor's Opinion.
That regulation then could be challenged under
the process provided by the Administrative
Procedure Act.

A ruling of the Court of

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on the regulation
would be strong authority either that the
Section 3 disqualification applied to all new
mineral leases or only to coal leases.
C.

Judicial Relief
1.

An action for a declaratory judgment on the
scope of the Section 3 disqualification pro
vision may present standing problems.

Until a

statute or regulation is construed against a
plaintiff, a court may be unwilling to act.
That problem is avoided by the rule-making and
appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act
as described above.
2.

In regard to the Section 6 diligence criteria,
judicial actions challenging the imposition of
those criteria on pre-FCLAA leases at
readjustment, apart from those cases where
there was a procedural defect in the read
justment, have proceeded on primarily con
stitutional grounds.
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